Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics
by Georgios Anagnostopoulos
Publisher: University of California Press 1994
ISBN/ASIN: 0520081250
ISBN-13: 9780520081253
Number of pages: 474
Description:
The author offers the most systematic critical examination to date of Aristotle's views on the exactness of ethics. Combining rigorous philosophical argument and analysis of the philosopher's treatises on human conduct, he gives form to Aristotle's belief that knowledge of matters of conduct can never be free of certain kinds of inexactness. He concludes that according to Aristotle, ethics constitutes a mode of knowledge that is neither totally nondemonstrative on account of its inexactness nor free of the important epistemological difficulties common to all nonmathematical disciplines.
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